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Abstract 
 
Historically, the Australian Government’s driver of performance in primary health care was 
dominated by the use of levers to effect change in General Practice. Accordingly, performance 
measurement directed at achieving population health outcomes has not received much traction and in 
its place, ad hoc strategies have been attempted. However, with the general trend to greater 
transparency and accountability and in an effort to address the challenges of chronic disease, 
Australia has more recently taken an alternative approach to performance management. This strategy 
has involved the establishment of Medicare Locals (MLs), a primary health organisation, targeted at 
the delivery of population health outcomes. A core responsibility of MLs is to provide data for a 
national system of public reporting on primary health care. The initiative marks a significant shift in 
thinking about performance measurement in Australia’s health system. This paper examines the 
policy contexts that have underpinned this move from the use of levers to the use of outcomes as a 
means to improve the quality of primary health care. It ends with a reflection on the possible 
challenges, tensions and contradictions that may be encountered with the implementation of MLs.
Medicare Locals 
1 | P a g e  
 
 
 
Medicare Locals and the performance regime in Primary Health Care: 
Medicare Locals 
 
Introduction 
Health systems around the world are undergoing major transformation and change due to the 
economic and social costs of accelerating rates of chronic disease (Alemu et al., 2002; Martin, 
Peterson, Robinson, & Sturmberg, 2009). Reform in Australia mimics global trends of building 
capacity in primary health care to better deliver and monitor coordinated care to patients with 
complex health care needs, supported by clinical protocols and guidelines, integration of services and 
support for patient self-management (Wagner et al., 2001; Wagner, Austin, & Von Korff, 1996; 
Zwar et al., 2006). In the Australian context, there is a focus on building a comprehensive primary 
health care system, which extends beyond the traditional and predominant general practice approach 
and is exemplified by a better integration of general practice with other primary care services and 
within the broader health care system and a stronger emphasis on meeting a community’s health 
needs and improving overall population health. Consequently, this involves new organisational 
governance arrangements, alongside revised funding arrangements and financial incentives, to 
encourage structural reform and changes in delivery systems and demonstrated improvements in 
performance. Most recently, there has been the establishment of a network of Primary Health Care 
Organisations (PHCOs), known as Medicare Locals (MLs), which form local governance networks. 
It is anticipated that MLs will have capacity to facilitate better integration of services, both within 
and across the primary health care sector, identify and monitor population needs, and undertake 
strategic planning to address gaps in service delivery and improve the patient journey (Australian 
Government Department of Health and Ageing [DoHA] 2010). The aims of this policy summary 
paper are to: summarise the policy context and describe the major reforms in primary health care; 
and describe the emergence of Medicare Locals and briefly outline some of the key issues related to 
this latest development in primary health care.  
Policy context and background of Primary Health Care reform 
Primary health care reform in Australia is being driven most recently by two key policy 
developments: The National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission’s (NHHRC) report, A 
Healthier Future for All Australians (2009) and the Australian Government Department of Health 
and Ageing’s first national primary health care strategy, Building a 21st Century Primary Health 
Care System (2010a). Both emphasise the need to enhance the capacity of primary health care to 
respond effectively to challenges of access and equity, cost, quality, efficiency and complexity of 
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need associated with chronic disease and demographic trends (NHHRC, 2009). General practitioners 
are considered to be well positioned to address the complex problem of chronic disease management 
(Harris & Zwar, 2007). However in Australia it has been proposed that several barriers exist to 
optimal practice. Harris and Zwar (2007) argue that this may be attributed to: 
• the dominance of fee-for-service funding of general practice, encouraging reactive 
rather than systematic care; 
• a lack of multidisciplinary patient care teams with many general practices; 
• limited engagement between general practice and patient self-management education 
programs; 
• underdeveloped information and decision support systems; and 
• a lack of physical infrastructure within many practices to allow workforce 
diversification. 
Numerous reforms have ensued in the area of primary health care since the introduction of Medicare 
in 1984 in response to concerns about efficiency, equity, the burgeoning cost of Medicare and 
quality, accountability and sustainability of a ‘fee-for-service’ sector (Swerissen & Duckett, 2002). 
These reforms have represented: general practice reform, delivery system reform, and major 
structural reform. They have addressed issues such as: professionalisation of General Practitioners 
(GPs); organisation and integration of general practice within the broader health care system; and 
general practice capability and capacity to manage complex care needs. Over time, the reform 
process has demonstrated a shift in government focus from initially strengthening of GPs’ 
professional autonomy, towards changes in delivery and governance of general practice, with a 
clearer definition of the role of GPs (Weller & Dunbar, 2005) within a broader concept of primary 
health care and within the broader health care system (Coote, 2009). Concomitantly, these reforms 
have shown an increasingly stronger interest in targeting the needs of communities, not simply 
general practices, population health planning and performance (Sturmberg, 2011). 
General Practice Reform  
General Practice Reform Strategy 
Major reform of Primary Health Care commenced in 1989, incorporating multiple initiatives directed 
at the professionalisation of general practice followed by a greater commitment to improving the 
quality of care and further definition of the role of GPs in Australia’s primary health care system 
(Weller & Dunbar, 2005). In 1991, this manifested itself in the General Practice Strategy that drove 
substantial form in primary care general practice over the next decade. The Strategy included 
workforce distribution initiatives, recognition of postgraduate training, voluntary accreditation, 
establishment of professional divisions and finally remuneration strategies to “reward quality of 
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care.....and enhance the role of general practitioners beyond individual patient care”(Bollen & 
Saltman, 2000, p. 23) .In addition, the strategy was an attempt to overcome problems resulting from 
the separation of responsibilities for primary (Commonwealth) and community (States and 
Territories) care, towards a better integration of the system.  
Vocational Registration for GPs was introduced by the Commonwealth in 1989 via practice 
accreditation by The Royal Australian College of General Practitioners (RACGP, 2010), as a strategy 
to improve the quality and cost effectiveness of health services (Blewitt, 1989). This was couched in 
incentive terms, directed at encouraging the professionalisation of general practice through 
registration to access higher fees made available through the Medical Benefits Schedule (MBS). The 
then Federal Minister for Communities and Health announced that:  
In the longer term, the Government expects general practitioners to be more 
willing to care for more complex conditions within their competence and to 
be more discriminating in their use of specialist referrals, prescribing and 
diagnostic tests. This should lead to reduced costs in the secondary and 
tertiary sectors and overall a much more effective use of health resources. 
(Blewitt, 1989, p. 18) 
In1992 Divisions of General Practice were established with the aim of integrating the role and work 
of GPs within the broader health care system. Divisions were to provide locally relevant support for 
GPs, with the objective of improving the quality and access to care and the efficiency of services. 
The concept of divisions were driven by the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners 
(RACGP) and the Australian Medical Association (AMA) (Bollen, 1997), nevertheless it resonated 
with the Australian Government’s desire to move away from the individualistic approach to health 
care and the inefficiencies of solo practices (Pegram, Sprogis, & Buckpitt, 1995). The Divisions were 
subsequently described as: 
“doctors working with doctors” to promote a “wellness culture” over an 
illness culture. The Divisions fill the gap between the Royal Australian 
College of General practice (which sets standards of professional 
competence) and individual GPs (who make decisions about what’s best for 
each patient). (DoHA, 2004, p. 2) 
The creation of regionally based Divisions with funding support from the Australian Government 
generated an infrastructure, managed by GPs, to serve as professional and administrative agencies 
(Pegram, et al., 1995; Swerissen & Duckett, 2002). The funding covered running costs through 
infrastructure grants as well as project grants for a wide range of community focused activities such 
as practitioner up-skilling, outreach services or programs to address chronic conditions (Pegram, et 
al., 1995). The organisations retained the discretion to decide how practices should meet the 
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objectives of government initiatives (Scott & Coote, 2007). In this respect, the introduction of the 
Divisions established a new focus on outcomes based funding. By 1998 the Australian Divisions of 
General Practice (ADGP) was formed as a representative national body, although this was not 
intended to take on a political role (Weller & Dunbar, 2005). However, in 2008 the ADGP reviewed 
its role and function and rebranded itself as the Australian General Practice Network (AGPN) in a 
strategy directed at convincing: 
government to see the Network as the provider of choice for new or expanded 
primary health care initiatives. This will lead to more secure, better resourced 
general practice sector with increased capacity to influence the future 
direction, management and funding of primary health care (AGPN, 2006, p. 
5).  
A review of the Divisions of General Practice (DoHA, 2004) was undertaken in 2003 and showed 
considerable difference across the Divisions in light of their focus and performance. As a result the 
government established a new national quality and performance system to hold the Divisions 
accountable for public funding, a system of peer review and ongoing audits. In addition, strong 
performances would receive additional funding and increased flexibility in reporting (DoHA, 2004).  
The subsequent National Quality and Performance System was introduced in 2005 to ideally serve as 
regulatory framework to link accountability objectives to quality improvement processes (Gardner, 
Sibthorpe, & Lonstaff, 2008) An assessment of the implementation of the framework indicates that 
Divisions were applying it in a “traditional command and control approach to monitoring cost, 
activity and output data” (Gardner, et al., 2008, p. 8) rather than as a tool for improving processes.  
In a response to a subsequent review of the health system (see the 2008 National Health and 
Hospitals Reform Commission discussed below) the RACGP commented that:  
The primary health care (PHC) sector in Australia is...governed from multiple 
points via centrally controlled, narrowly focused and frequently 
discontinuous programs. This creates major instability, inefficiency and 
frustration at every level, and impacts on workforce recruitment, morale and 
sustainability across all PHC disciplines...The creation of multiple specific 
purpose general practice entities with no overarching plan and little 
functional connection has been a feature of the last decade. (2009, pp. 1-2) 
This suggests that the Divisions as primary health care organisations had come to represent a 
substantial, government funded, administrative network (Coote, 2009) but was less effective in 
positioning GPs within the broader health care system.  
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Better Practice Program 1994 
The Better Practice Program (BPP) was an alternative funding model designed with an objective of 
alleviating the limitations of the MBS. This was an attempt by the Commonwealth to move from 
reliance on a fee-for-service approach to primary health care (Weller & Dunbar, 2005). However, the 
BPP was been argued to have contributed to the deskilling of GPs resulting in increased referrals to 
specialist doctors (Dugdale, 1997). 
To be considered eligible for this supplementary funding, practices had to meet criteria drawn from 
the RACGP standards for accreditation. In return, the funding served as an incentive for practices to 
improve patient loyalty and therefore continuity of care as well as to shift practices to underserviced 
rural and remote areas (Dugdale, 1997). However the program emerged during an uneasy period of 
relations between the Federal government and the RACGP and the AMA (Bollen & Saltman, 2000). 
In addition, there were concerns with the fairness of the funding formula used to determine the 
payments (Dugdale, 1997) and as a result, uptake was slow and limited (Bollen & Saltman, 2000). 
Despite the relative failure of the program and its eventual abandonment by the Federal government, 
Dugdale (1997) argued it marked an important shift in funding policy: 
The value of the BPP is not primarily its capacity to improve patient loyalty 
or encourage doctors to move to rural areas, although these things would 
have been valuable achievements. These explicit policy objectives are the 
acceptable clothing for a muscular new technology of government. The 
primary significance of the BPP is that a new set of public sector financial 
incentives has been instituted for governing general practice. (1997, p. 73) 
Practice Incentives Program 1999 
The Practice Incentives Program (PIP) was initiated in 1999 to encourage short and long term 
changes to general practice through a new form of blended payment. It was designed to complement 
fee-for-service by providing another funding stream for eligible practices which met quality and 
accreditation standards (Duckett & Willcox, 2011). The PIP provides incentive payments to 
accredited general practices and Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Services (ACCHSs), on 
the assumption that incentivising enhanced quality of care, in addition to fee-for-service, will 
facilitate improvements in health outcomes (Couzos & Delaney Thiele, 2011).  
The PIP signified a pay-for-performance model of incentive funding, reflective of a general global 
shift in health policy, aimed at driving improvements in primary health care (Boxall, 2009; de Bruin, 
Baan, & Struijs, 2011; Mcloughlin, Leatherman, Fletcher, & Wyn Owen, 2001). This approach to 
public health management adopts a variety of strategies based on a similar premise that practitioners 
receive financial rewards when they are able to meet quality improvement benchmarks (Boxall, 
2009).  
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The program is administered by Medicare on behalf of the Department of Health and Ageing 
(DoHA). Depending on the scheme, practices can receive a one-off sign-on payment per 
Standardised Whole Patient Equivalent (SWPE). In addition, GPs can earn a Service Incentive 
Payment (SIP) for implementing particular “cycle of care” set out by RACGP clinical guidelines. To 
be eligible for the supplementary payments, practices must first seek accreditation from the RACGP 
as the organisation given responsibility for establishing the Standards for General Practice (RACGP, 
2010). Access to PIP payments is a key driver for practices to seek accreditation (ANAO, 2010). 
These guidelines, directed at improving the quality of care, serve as a “proxy for outcomes” (Cashin 
& Chi, 2011, p. 3).  
In performance management terms, this provides a direct financial leverage on GP behaviour. Pay-
for-performance strategies in health care face several challenges in their design. The following 
example of a PIP initiative directed at chronic disease, illustrates the tensions involved in its 
implementation and its unexpected consequences.  
Example: PIP – Diabetes 
In 1996, the Federal Government formally recognised Diabetes as a National Health Priority 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare & Commonwealth Department of Health and Family 
Services, 1997) triggering the development of policies and funding initiatives to address the 
management of this chronic disease. In July of 1998 a new form of blended payment for the 
treatment of patients with diabetes was introduced in the form of the Practice Incentive Program-
Diabetes Incentive (PIP-DI) (Scott, Schurer, Jensne, & Sivey, 2009). By 2001 the government’s 
strategy for the management of this chronic health problem was realised through a $76 million 
National Integrated Diabetes Program directed at financial incentives for GPs and General Practice 
Divisions to improve diabetes care (Miller & Valenti, 2009). This co-occurred with the release of 
new detection and management guidelines for Type 2 diabetes (Australian Centre for Diabetes 
Strategies, 2005) setting out expectations of good clinical practice. 
Eligible practices receive a one-off sign-on payment of $1.00 per Standardised Whole Patient 
Equivalent (SWPE)
1
. This payment requires practices to maintain a register of patients, including an 
active system for recalling and reminding them as well as implementing a “cycle of care” (Medicare 
Australia, 2011, p. 2). The diabetes mellitus cycle of care involves the minimum requirements for the 
management of the disease as set out by the RACGP guidelines. These are annual reviews that 
include testing, reviews and evaluation of: blood pressure, weight, feet, eyes, blood sugar, blood 
lipids, urine, smoking, diet, physical activity, self-care education and medication (Royal Australian 
College of General Practitioners & Diabetes Australia, 2011).  
                                                 
1
 On average, a full-time GP has approximately 1,000 SWPEs annually (Medicare Australia, 2011) 
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In addition, the practice receives $20 per diabetic SWPE when at least two percent of their patients 
are diagnosed with diabetes mellitus and a cycle of care has been completed for at least 20 per cent 
of these patients. Each completed cycle of care with individual patients attracts a $40 Service 
Incentive Payment (SIP). In order to receive the quarterly payments, practices are required to 
substantiate claims for payments, provide accurate information for Medicare’s ongoing audit 
program and advise the administrative organisation in writing of any changes to the practice 
arrangements (Medicare Australia, 2011). In 2009-10, practices received on average, $57,800 
annually as PIP payments of which $10, 017 was attributed to the care of patients with diabetes 
(ANAO, 2010). Table 1 details the Federal Government’s total annual expenditure on the PIP-DI, 
encompassing all three forms of payments (Roxon, 2011). To date there remains no reporting 
requirements for practices to account for how payments are used (Cashin & Chi, 2011). 
  
Table 1:  Annual Expenditure for the PIP-DI (Roxon, 2011) 
 
2006-2007 $14.888m 
2007-2008 $16.390m 
2008-2009 $15.764m 
2009-2010 $17.236m 
 
A report by the Australian National Audit Office (2010) on the PIP indicates that the complex nature 
of the program can produce a number of problems. These include: 
• barriers to accreditation, for example the high costs associated with the process, can be a 
problem for some types of practices trying to accessing the funding program; 
• unintended consequences related to the use of SWPE to determine PIP payments, for example 
the rewarding of practices with higher number of patient visits rather than practices 
encouraging longer, individual consultations; 
• problems in DoHA’s use of take-up statistics rather than effectiveness measures to inform the 
government of the program’s success in meeting its objectives; 
• some concerns with the Medicare’s capacity to provide DoHA with current practice 
information in order to assure the accuracy of payments or the eligibility for the program. 
Saunders, Schattner and Mathews (2008) argue that the uptake of PIP-DI has been variable amongst 
GPs. Their research involving 22 GPs from a single division of practice indicated that every practice 
had a unique system in place to implement the diabetes SIP and there were suggestions that GP 
decision making was highly contextualised to local communities. Here they comment:  
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One GP implemented the cycle only for patients who agreed to comply with 
the GP’s requirement of quarterly visits. Two GPs stated that they would only 
claim the SIPs for their ‘loyal’ or ‘faithful’ patients, i.e. those seeing only one 
GP. Both of these GPs were in an area where patients commonly visit 
multiple practices.(Saunders, et al., 2008, p. 782) 
Other barriers to the incentive program included concerns about patient attitudes, uncertainty about 
Medicare claims, lack of time, paperwork and difficulties getting colleagues on-board (Saunders, et 
al., 2008). 
In addition, Australian research into the implications of the incentive payments on patient care 
suggests a number of forces might be at play. While there are some indications of enhancement in 
care based on the clinical guidelines (Georgiou, Burns, & Harris, 2004; Scott, et al., 2009) these 
improvements were also connected to contextual issues such as practice size, location or the 
availability of IT support (Georgiou, et al., 2004). Accordingly, while the research indicates 
improvements in the quality of care for patients with diabetes as a consequence of the policy, the GP 
uptake of the payment may be associated with such issues as the socio-economic status of patients or 
the internal supports or dynamics of the practice itself.  
The design of the program has also created some disquiet as to possible unintended consequences. 
Young, Scott and Best (2010) raised several concerns. First, that the payments could induce practices 
to game the system, for example by only including those patients with well controlled diabetes. 
Second, the program’s payment of outcomes is dependent on practice level data, which in turn 
requires investment in information management systems and the privileging of certain types of 
practices. Third, the multiple sources of additional funding being made available may create red tape 
processes that serve as disincentives to GP behaviour change (Young, et al., 2010). 
In 2010, the PIP program included 13 incentives schemes to complement the MBS providing fee-for-
service payments to GPs. Currently, 82.8% of general practice patient care is provided by doctors 
participating in the PIP (DoHA, 2011a) making it the largest government program directed at the 
reform of general practice (ANAO, 2010). However, a recent review of the PIP by The World Bank 
indicated that too little evidence is available to justify the $2.7billion spent on the program since its 
inception in 1998 (Cashin & Chi, 2011). The report (Cashin & Chi, 2011) indicated that the program 
design maintained several barriers likely to impact performance. First, its complex structure has 
rendered its monitoring difficult and payments to practices less transparent. Second, the scheme 
allows for practitioners to access incentive programs that have the greatest potential for reward. To 
this end, incentive programs directed at chronic conditions were less likely to be taken up, based on 
the required effort perceived by practitioners. Finally, the report argued that as no reports are 
available indicating trends in performance, the program has failed to exploit the potential of 
improved data collection for policy or service delivery.  
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Mcloughlin et.al (2001) argue that the unique structural conditions of health care funding in different 
countries set the context for how pay-for-performance models are implemented. In Australia, the 
authors believe that the overlapping roles of Commonwealth and State governments and the 
existence of a universal health scheme, creates a scenario where quality improvement requirements 
are negotiated and implemented in order to establish nationally consistent measures and benchmarks. 
This has meant that ideally, Australia is well positioned to maximise the impact of pay-for-
performance funding through its capacity to access national datasets on quality of care measures 
(Mcloughlin, et al., 2001). 
However, there is a surprising lack of evidence to indicate that pay-for-performance health care 
policies have a direct effect on the improvement of healthcare quality (de Bruin, et al., 2011) Indeed 
Boxall argues that “policymakers seeking to justify the widespread implementation of P4P [Pay for 
Performance] schemes in the health care sector based on the strength of the available evidence will 
find it a difficult task” (Boxall, 2009, p. 16). 
The PIP, as an example of formula funding of general practice, has been argued to represent a neo-
liberal mode of government (Dugdale, 2008) through its attempts to influence the GP behaviour via 
incentive payments. This is underpinned by quasi-market objectives promoting freedom of choice for 
both Doctors and patients to take up the program and thereby engage with the type of health care 
practices proposed by the government (Dugdale, 2008) 
Reform of General Practice in Australia, initiated by the professionalisation of practice, the 
introduction of administrative, professional agencies and the use of incentive funding have formed 
the basis of GP performance management for almost 25 years. What follows is an account of efforts 
to reconsider the delivery of health services in Australia as a strategy to address a major economic 
challenge.  
Delivery System Reform 
Many of the reforms in the area of primary health care in Australia have been centred on achieving 
the optimal funding model for a ‘fee-for-service’ approach but also supporting the optimal model of 
care to achieve good population outcomes. The justification is based on the economic and social 
costs of accelerating rates of chronic disease (Alemu, et al., 2002). An ongoing criticism of the 
funding model for primary health care in Australia was that it generally encouraged episodic and 
short-term interactions between GPs and individual patients, rather than continuity of care, and was 
ineffective in driving broader population targets (Duckett & Willcox, 2011). Consequently, reforms 
have also drawn on a dominant discourse that constructs chronic disease as a burden and an 
economic challenge (Martin & Peterson, 2009). In 2002, a World Health Organisation (WHO) report 
argued that due to the aging population and the relative success in general health care, countries were 
now in a situation of having to address long-term demands on their systems. Accordingly chronic 
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disease was described as “the challenge of this century”(Alemu, et al., 2002, p. 29) and therefore in 
need of urgent resolution.  
The WHO led the way with the development of the Innovate Care of Chronic Conditions (ICCC) 
framework (Alemu, et al., 2002) to initiate systemic reform of health care systems. The guiding 
principles of the framework include (Alemu, et al., 2002): 
• evidence based decision making for policy-making, this includes the use of 
information about clinical processes of care and expected patient outcomes; 
• a population focus, involving the prioritising of specific chronic conditions where 
treatment and support needs are well understood; 
• a prevention focus, where patients are given information and skills to reduce health 
risks; 
• a quality focus, to ensure resources are properly utilised and where practitioners are 
held accountable; 
• integration, where boundaries between different levels of care and interventions are 
blurred; and 
• flexibility/adaptability requiring surveillance and evaluation of the system in order to 
respond to changing contexts and situations.  
In Australia it has been argued that the principles of chronic care management have been adopted as 
a “service template rather than as a conceptual framework” (Martin, et al., 2009, p. 10). Here there 
are concerns that an uncritical implementation of the model is “fraught with potential unintended 
consequences” (Martin & Peterson, 2009, p. 581) on the basis that the focus on prevention has its 
own social effects. Martin and Peterson (2009) make reference to tertiary level interventions  
directed at reducing the complications of chronic conditions, representative of the PIP, that have had 
consequences for widening health disparities or the failure of these preventative measures to 
ameliorate chronic disease.  
Nevertheless, the urgency to better manage chronic disease and improve population health outcomes 
has generated a number of reforms in primary care in Australia amongst which are: the Coordinated 
Care Trials; and the Enhanced Primary Care (EPC) program. These prevention initiatives have 
focused on primary health care as the point of intervention and have adopted a particular discourse 
on chronicity emphasising the values of evidence based medicine. This has translated to prevention 
strategies utilising clinical disease protocols as a basis for “payment and decision making” (Martin & 
Peterson, 2009, p. 581). 
Coordinated Care Trials 1995 
The flexibility and capacity of the health system to respond to complex health needs became the 
focus for health reform in 1994 (Marcus, 1999) and 1995 (COAG, 1995). Although the Council of 
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Australian Governments (COAG) identified three categories of individual needed to be considered in 
change efforts, the coordination of health care for patients was to be at the hub of this transformation 
(Duckett, Hogan, & Southgate, 1995). The reforms were argued to be underpinned by COAGs’ new 
attention to the delivery of an effective and efficient health care system in order to produce “better 
outcomes by becoming more people focused” (Duckett, et al., 1995, p. 4). The eventual strategy in 
the form of Coordinated Care Trials (CCTs), was also directed at positioning GPs to play “a central 
role as the architect of change, rather than simply being technicians in the process” (Silagy, 2000, p. 
471). Finally, it was argued that the CCTs would “ break down the barriers between Federal and 
State programmes and services” (Joyce, 1996, ¶5) in reference to the charges of cost-shifting that had 
plagued commonwealth-state relations (Marcus, 1999).  
Health reform was directed at identifying evidence based strategies, services and approaches to the 
coordination of care that could be subsequently applied on a broader scale (Duckett, et al., 1995). 
The major premise underpinning the COAG reforms was that "that better coordination of the care of 
people with chronic or complex needs would reduce hospitalisation, and the savings could cover the 
costs of coordination” (Esterman & Ben-Tovim, 2002, p. 469).. Accordingly, Federal and State 
governments became the co-sponsors of 13 trials (Joyce, 1996; Marcus, 1999) directed at identifying 
innovative, cost effective services that would lead to improved outcomes. This was further extended 
to another five in 2002 (Anderson, 2004). The trials were able to draw on a pool of Commonwealth 
and State funding to buy services identified in individual care plans and to cover administration costs 
(Silagy, 2000). This was later boosted by funding from the Enhanced Primary Care program (see 
below) (Anderson, 2004). 
However, the trials did not produce substantive evidence linking innovative coordination of care 
services to patient health outcomes, including savings from reduced hospital admissions (Esterman & 
Ben-Tovim, 2002; Silagy, 2000). This was attributed in part to the structure of the program imposing 
methodological limitations to the trials (Esterman & Ben-Tovim, 2002), but might also be attributed 
to the ambitious nature of the trials that would have to “show how to get the money, how to spend it, 
how to get the right co-ordinators, and how to deal with staff issues.” (Duckett, et al., 1995, p. 8). In 
addition, it has been noted that barriers to GP involvement in the trials were also attributed to 
concerns about administrative demands and perceptions of loss of professional autonomy (Marcus, 
1999; Silagy, 2000). 
Enhanced Primary Care program 1999 
The Enhanced Primary Care (EPC) program was introduced with the aim of encouraging the 
development of coordinated and multidisciplinary care (Swerissen & Taylor, 2008; Zwar, et al., 
2006). It included specific payments for GPs to undertake health assessments and care planning, as 
well as patient centred case conferencing (Blakeman, Harris, Comino, & Zwar, 2001). The program 
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therefore offered financial incentive to GPs to work collaboratively with other health professionals to 
develop care plans for patients with chronic diseases and complex needs (Harris & Zwar, 2007).  
However, the program experienced difficulties when it became evident that it had certain 
implications for the work of GPs. While doctors increased their take up of health assessments, this 
did not necessarily translate to engagement with a multidisciplinary team (Blakeman, et al., 2001). In 
addition there was some indication that the organisational and time requirements required of GPs 
served as barriers to case planning (Blakeman, Zwar, & Harris, 2002). In 2003 a report into the 
burden of policy initiatives, general practice administrative costs were estimated to be $13,100 
annually per GP (Productivity Commission, 2003). Three programs, the PIP, vocational registration 
and the EPC accounted for over three quarters of those costs (Productivity Commission, 2003).  
In response to this, the EPC was later revised in 2005 with new Medicare items to better streamline 
care planning and facilitate collaborative meetings. The Chronic Disease Management (CDM) items 
were once again directed at care planning and case conferencing and could have been the reason 
behind the increased use of ECP Medicare items between 2005 and 2009 (Steering Committee for 
the Review of Government Service Provision, 2009). 
In 2005, as part of the National Chronic Disease strategy, it was argued that:  
Significant resources are being committed to chronic disease prevention 
programs with only a limited evidence-base that is being informed by a range 
of disparate health data collections at both Federal and State levels. This 
places serious limits on our capacity to target and track the impact of these 
investments. Current practice is neither sustainable nor efficient, and an 
alternative approach is required. (National Public Health Partnership, 2006, p. 
5) 
While the strategy to address these concerns were directed at the implementation of a surveillance 
system to be managed by the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) (National Public 
Health Partnership, 2006) to connect system performance to health outcomes, the proposal did not 
extend to the auditing of general practice.  
The effects of the co-occurring reform efforts to address the management of chronic disease and the 
building of general practice capacity, have been considered to be still somewhat limited (Harris & 
Zwar, 2007). Harris and Zwar in 2007 argued that “although there is some evidence of improved 
uptake and trends in quality of care, there are few published data to demonstrate that the introduction 
of these initiatives have been associated with improved patient health outcomes” (p. 105). This 
suggests that despite a focus on evidence based medicine, clinical protocols and pay for performance 
funding, an unequivocal link to outcomes has proved problematic. Harris and Zwar (2007) propose 
that Australia’s lack of significant advancement in the management of chronic diseases is in: 
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part due to the lack of systemic implementation of evidence based guidelines 
through audit and incentives...However, long-term widespread change 
requires a clear national strategy for primary health care, which, among other 
things, tasks our Divisions to develop a common clinical governance culture 
within general practice. (p. 106) 
This would suggest that by the end of 2007, with a general election looming, there was recognition 
that health reform initiatives directed at changing GP behaviour to link the quality of care directly to 
improved patient outcomes, had not been achieved. In addition, the solution proposed was through 
some sort of possible re-deployment of the Divisions of General Practice as a strategy to re-culture 
with work of GPs. 
Major Structural Reform 
National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission 
Soon after the 2007 election, Labor entered into an extensive process of consultation and information 
gathering directed at determining the systemic problems inherent in the health system. By February 
2008, Prime Minister Rudd and his Minister for Health and Ageing, Nicola Roxon had announced 
the establishment of the National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission (NHHRC) with the 
objective of developing a “long-term health reform plan for a modern Australia” (February 25, 2008, 
p. 1). This was subsequently followed by the formation of a National Preventative Health Taskforce 
directed at ensuring that proactive health measures were included in future funding agreements 
between Commonwealth and State governments. Soon after, the Minister for Health and Ageing 
launched a National Primary Health Care Strategy directed at “better [tackling] the health challenges 
of the 21st century….the strategy will provide a road map for the future direction of primary care in 
Australia” (Roxon, June 11, 2008, p. 1).  
Following its establishment in 2008, the NHHRC was given responsibility to deliver a report, A 
Healthier Future for all Australians (NHHRC, 2009). The report presented over 100 
recommendations directed at the transformation of Australia’s health system. Significantly, it was 
argued that:  
there is a lack of transparency and no clear leadership across the whole 
system. People do not find it easy to know which government to hold to 
account- or how to effectively hold them to account- for their access to health 
care and the quality of that care, and resent it when governments focus on 
shifting cost and blame rather than making things work….They want reforms 
put in place that will make out health system work well, but many are 
concerned about the ability of our governments to work effectively together 
to do so. (NHHRC, 2009, p. 146) 
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Unlike previous reform efforts, A Healthier Future for All Australians (2009) suggested major 
structural reform of the health care system. The NHHRC report included a recommendation that “the 
Commonwealth government take responsibility for the policy and public funding of primary health 
care services” (NHHRC, 2009, p. 102). The rationale that this would boost primary health care 
infrastructure and primary health care services, better able to establish continuous and coordinated 
care for people with complex health need as well as population health planning (NHHRC, 2009). In 
addition, the report recommended the establishment of PHCOs to support primary health care 
services in order to take on these broader roles. It was proposed that the new PHCOs, to be known as 
Medical Locals (MLs) would evolve from or replace the traditional Divisions of General Practice. 
A core group of recommendations was directed at driving cultural change and a continuous culture of 
reform through quality performance and integration of clinical and corporates accountabilities 
(NHHRC, 2009, p. 125). In this case, cultural change necessitates greater attention to community 
engagement, valuing of the wider health professional workforce and encouragement of clinical 
leadership and decision making focused on evidence based practice and use of data and critical 
evaluation.  
The report also addressed the necessity of accountability processes for reform of Australia’s health 
system. Specifically, the Commission recommended that the COAG Reform Council should monitor 
and report on the performance of state governments against national reform agreements. It was 
proposed that there should be three measures of success in the health system: “measures of the 
performance of the health services, of the public’s confidence in the health system, and of the 
satisfaction of those working in it” (NHHRC, 2009, p. 167). 
Primary health care would be subject to a set of national standards and increased requirements for 
public reporting. This requirement for transparency was argued to be consequential as “Patients and 
the Australian community do not have sufficient information about the performance of their local 
hospital, general practitioners and other health care providers in the system” (Australian 
Government, 2010p. 56). Significantly, the Commonwealth government, as the majority funder of 
health services would be well positioned to “impose strong national standards……backed up by 
explicit financial rewards and penalties” (Australian Government, 2010, p. 57). With the exception of 
Western Australia, COAG agreed to the reform plan and its revision of Commonwealth and State 
roles and responsibilities (COAG, April 19 and 20 2010).  
In 2010, then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd announced that the Commonwealth would fund up to 
100% of the costs associated with primary health care in a strategy directed at ending the ‘blame 
game’(March 3 2010). He commented that  
With the Australian Government paying more of the hospital bills, it will 
have the incentive to make sure people are treated through less expensive and 
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more appropriate primary care services….By taking full funding and policy 
responsibility for primary care we can also reduce the number of hospital 
admissions that could be avoided through providing better care in the 
community” (Rudd, March 3 2010,¶118-124). 
According to (Donato & Segal, 2010) this shift to a single funding governance structure creates the 
necessary context for the development of PHCOs and therefore the “efficient and equitable delivery 
of primary care” (Segal, 2008, p. 2). Here it was proposed that the split between Commonwealth and 
State funding responsibilities served to fragment the system sufficiently to impede the development 
of integrated and coordinated care. Donato and Segal (2010) argued that “ the allocation of primary 
healthcare budgets on a needs-adjusted capitation basis is the key mechanism and financial driver for 
PHCOs to coordinate and manage the delivery of health services for its defined population” (p. 615). 
More specifically the authors suggested that the development of PHCOs in conjunction with the 
development of a single fund holder as well as clearer accountability requirements, would serve as a 
foundation for the implementation of a national quality and performance framework (Donato & 
Segal, 2010).  
However resistance to the new funding arrangement required a re-negotiation with the States 
resulting in an amended COAG National Health Reform Agreement originally developed in 2008. In 
this 2011 agreement, the Commonwealth backed away from full responsibility for primary care, 
towards greater recognition of the States’ role. The Agreement states that while the Commonwealth 
would maintain full funding and responsibility for aged care, it would have “lead responsibility for 
GP and primary care” (COAG, 2011, p. 4) requiring a partnership relationship with the States.  
This relinquishment of full funding and therefore total policy control of primary health care marks a 
failure to achieve substantive structural change. Segal, Dalziel and Donato (2011) have argued that 
this: 
undermines the ability of the reforms to deliver benefits. It represents an 
expensive package but one that is likely to compound existing inefficiencies. 
Health financing is still to be directed to health services based on pre-existing 
professional and discipline and program boundaries. In the absence of 
capitated fundholding or third-party purchasing capabilities, Medicare Locals 
can only operate as advisory agents….Distortions which currently plague the 
health system will remain. The ‘reforms’ may rather further entrench 
distortions, for instance with the centrality of the general practitioner and 
medical model of health again privileged.” (pp. 47-48)  
The inability of the Rudd government to overcome inherent problems associated with the divisions of 
government responsibility for health has therefore been constructed by health economists as the 
major stumbling block for the transformation of primary health care through an alternative form of 
local governance over a clinically focused, general practice profession. 
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Medicare Locals - Local Governance Networks for Primary Health Care 
Traditionally in Australia, a Division of General Practices operated as a type of PHCO (Scott & 
Coote, 2010). The aims of this kind of organisation is “to increase the influence of primary care 
professionals, and in particular general practitioners (GPs), in health planning and resource 
allocation, and in the health system more generally” (Smith & Goowin (2006) cited in Smith & 
Mays, 2007, p. 4) Accordingly, PHCOs as a form of professional network, have been employed by a 
number of countries (Donato & Segal, 2010; Smith & Mays, 2007) to reform health systems towards 
a greater focus on primary care. However there are substantive differences across countries as to 
PHCO’s objectives, roles and functions (Scott & Coote, 2010).These organisations have occupied an 
important part of the governance of primary health care, yet it is argued that they have been more 
influential in adapting general practice infrastructure than altering or contributing to clinical 
performance (Scott & Coote, 2010) 
In 2010, COAG announced that it would introduce a new form of PHCO. These bodies would 
improve the “integration of services and [reduce] access gaps so that their local community can 
access care that meets local needs”(COAG, April 19 and 20 2010, p. 4). In an address to a Health 
reform summit, Nicola Roxon stated that the Government viewed these PHCO, to be known as 
Medicare Locals, as “the enablers, or coordinators…the glue that will help bring these often 
disconnected parts of the primary care system together” (Roxan, February 8, 2011, p. 5) and 
therefore of particular benefit for those people with chronic diseases. 
In February 2011, the government released initial guidelines (DoHA, 2011b) for the establishment 
and operation of Medicare Locals. Organisations were invited to apply for the first group of 15 
Medicare locals expected to begin operation from July 1, 2011. This initial group would be drawn 
from: 
high performing Divisions of General Practice, preferably working in 
partnership with other organisations. 
The subsequent groups of Medicare Locals will build on the expertise and 
capacity of existing primary care organisation, particularly partnerships 
between Divisions of General Practice and other primary health care 
organisations and services. (Prime Minister & Minister for Health and 
Ageing, February 22, 2011, p. 2)  
Donato and Segal (2010) argue that PHCO’s serve as a meso-level organisational structure where 
GPs are assimilated into the governance of the primary health system. Here they describe the 
organisation as the vehicle for:  
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coordinating primary and community services; coordinating and addressing 
population health issues; experimenting with a range of provider payment 
methods beyond fee-for service; effecting national quality assurance and 
accountability frameworks; and developing performance management and 
oversight of the quality of health service providers. (p. 615)  
Accordingly, PHCOs as a new governance structure are positioned as another strategy for primary 
health care reform, better able to address major challenges (for example chronic disease and 
workforce projections). In addition and with respect to problems associated with the over reliance on 
fee-for-service payments to GPs, a:  
PCO [Primary Care Organisations] becomes the vehicle through which a 
range of blended provider payment methods can be experimented with and 
developed over time. Unless the reliance on fee-for-service and its implied 
clinical focus can be reduced, the capacity for delivery of preventative 
population health initiatives at the local level will be impaired. (Donato & 
Segal, 2010, p. 616)  
In light of this, MLs have been constructed by some as the possible panacea for the complex of 
problems associated with Australia’s health care system. The Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) defined the key functions of the new PHCO as being “ responsible for improving 
integration of services and reducing access gaps so that their local community can access care that 
meets local needs” (COAG, April 19 and 20 2010, p. 4).  
By October of 2010 a discussion paper (DoHA, 2010b) was released by the Department of Health 
and Aging (DoHA) inviting submissions by the following month, on the governance and function of 
MLs. The paper proposed that the first group would evolve from high performing Divisions of 
General Practice able to demonstrate their capacity to take on additional functions and 
responsibilities. Five key objectives for MLs were detailed:  
• Identification of the health needs of local areas and development of locally focused 
and responsive services including a stronger focus on prevention and early 
intervention;  
• Improving the patient journey through developing integrated and coordinated 
services;  
• Providing support to clinicians and service providers to improve patient care, 
particularly the better prevention and management of chronic disease;  
• Facilitating the implementation and successful performance of primary healthcare 
initiatives and programs; and  
• Being efficient and accountable with strong governance and effective management. 
(DoHA, 2010b, p. 5)  
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In addition, it was announced that MLs were to be Commonwealth funded, independent companies 
subject to the Corporations Act 2001 (DoHA, 2011b). Funding for the new organisations would 
therefore replace the Commonwealth’s financial support of the Divisions. In the future, MLs will be 
required to gain accreditation from an approved agency. The Department of Health and Ageing have 
implemented a tendering process to develop a set of accreditation standards, support and training 
materials in preparation of this accreditation.  
Furthermore, MLs are expected to be closely aligned to several government initiatives directed at 
primary health care reform (DoHA, 2011b). These include: 
• instituting collaboration with Local Hospital Networks and local Lead Clinical 
Groups; 
• supporting the development of e-health including “data provision to drive health 
system performance, service planning, monitoring and evaluation” (DoHA, 2011b, p. 
5). 
• advance primary health care services in response to local needs; 
• support of health care infrastructure such as GP Super Clinics; 
• [building] primary health care workforce capacity to meet local needs; and 
• [implementing] Government reform initiatives directed at disease prevention and 
management, as well as access to services.  
Once completed, 62 Medical Local organisations are expected to be in operation across Australia 
(Roxon, November 4, 2011). Eventually the Medicare Local network will receive approximately 
$171 million annually from the Commonwealth, to be distributed on a funding formula that takes 
into account community characteristics (DoHA, 2011b).  
Applications for ML funding must meet six extensive selection criteria. Significantly, the operational 
arrangements are expected to provide a structure that “recognises the diversity of clinicians, services 
and health care recipients within the modern primary health care sector” (DoHA, 2011b, p. 15) 
indicating a move away from GP centric PHCOs, towards broader community and health 
professional representation (DoHA, 2011b). In addition, the selection criteria requires applicants to 
demonstrate expertise in data collection and analysis suggesting that MLs are positioned as agencies 
or repositories of information on local health concerns, GP practices and patient outcomes.  
The work of Medicare Locals will be supported by the newly established Australian Medicare Local 
Alliance, which came into operation on 1 July 2012. In taking a national leadership role, the Alliance 
will also consult and work with general practice, allied health, health, aged and social care sectors in 
addressing strategies around preventive health and health promotion within the primary health care 
sector.  
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Medicare Locals will contribute towards and be subject to performance monitoring and reporting 
under the requirements of National Health Reform. “New reporting requirements will be centralised 
and standardised, focussing on achievement against new performance standards” (DoHA, 2011b, p. 
11). Accordingly, each ML will be assessed against service and accounting reporting standards 
detailing access to and quality of service, finances, patient outcomes and/or experiences. 
Significantly, “these new performance standards will, over time, be linked to performance 
managements for Medicare Locals and be outcomes focussed” (DoHA, 2011b, p. 11). The newly 
established National Health Performance Authority (NHPA) will report on the performance of MLs 
through publicly available Healthy Communities reports.  
National Performance Authority announcement 2010 
As part of the Australian Government’s transparency and public reporting agenda, a National Health 
Performance Authority (NHPA) has been established as an independent agency. The NHPA is 
responsible for compiling and synthesising the data from primary health care systems and will 
therefore provide locally relevant but also nationally consistent information about the performance of 
the primary health care system. The Healthy Communities reports will focus on areas of 
accountability for Medicare Locals as key middle level organisations in the primary health care 
system and be based on key indicators contained within the Performance and Accountability 
Framework (henceforth the Framework)
2
 . The Framework released in May 2012 contains measures 
of safety, quality, access, efficiency, and financial performance. For MLs, performance will be 
measured initially against the domains of equity, effectiveness and efficiency. Although indicators 
for each of the domains will continue to evolve, the NHPA has identified a range of indicators
3
. The 
interpretation of performance information will take into account of the unique geographical, 
population and socio-economic elements of individual MLs.  
Establishment of the NHPA as a statutory authority, has been underpinned by the National Health 
Reform Amendment (National Health Performance Authority) Bill 2011 (The Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2011). During the second reading of the bill, Roxon argued that it was 
legislation that would: 
form part of the new backbone of a modern, integrated, high performing 
health system...to create a National Health Performance Authority – the new 
watchdog for Australia’s health system…This forms one critical element of a 
new health system – one that is sustainable, transparent, efficient, high 
performing and well resourced. (Commonwealth of Australia House of 
Representatives, March 3, 2011, p. 2192) 
                                                 
2
 http://www.nhpa.gov.au/internet/nhpa/publishing.nsf/Content/PAF 
3
 http://www.nhpa.gov.au/internet/nhpa/publishing.nsf/Content/PAF~PAF-Section-6~PAF-Section-6-3#fig6image 
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However, by June of 2011 Victoria and Western Australia were expressing considerable concern 
with the potential of the new authority to identify underperforming hospitals (Dunlevy, June 3, 2011; 
Medew, June 8, 2011) which had the effect of delaying the creation of the authority. The bill was 
eventually signed in October of 2011 to establish the Authority. 
Reflection  
It is evident to date that realising a broader concept of primary health care, with a strong focus on 
population health and planning has been difficult to achieve in general practice settings, despite the 
wide range of reforms around funding, financial incentives and delivery system changes. It is 
reasonable to suggest that government reform efforts often sit uneasily with the GP community. A 
1997 survey of GPs satisfaction and sense of fulfilment with their work and its influence on the 
quality of care for patients, indicates personal tensions between the need for reform and government 
efforts to remedy the problem. The authors argue that: 
GPs appear to be caught in a bind between wanting structural change to 
general practice to improve its viability and affirm its pivotal role in the 
health system, and resenting strategies of government and GP professional 
bodies which are designed to improve the status and functioning of the 
profession. (Bailie et al., 1998, p. 64) 
It could be argued, that underpinning this tension is concerns with the professional autonomy of GPs 
and its connection to increased “rules, incentives and pressures to change how GPs work” (Lewis, 
Marjoribanks, & Pirotta, 2003, p. 46). While this challenge to autonomy often translates to 
significant pressure of doctors’ professional bodies on government policy development and 
implementation, it may also manifest itself in personal resistance to reform initiatives. Some of the 
uncertainties and tensions inherent in the ML approach include the extent of control that will be 
exerted over general practices and clinical decision-making both in terms of priority-setting and 
funding. These issues were raised by the AMA
4
 in response to a Department of Health and Ageing’s 
discussion paper on the governance and functions of Medicare Locals (DoHA, 2010b).    
Nonetheless, the formation of MLs as an alternative PHCO marks a new era in Australian primary 
health care governance. They have been described as the vehicle by which the major health policy 
reforms of the Rudd government can be realised (AGPN, 2009) In this respect MLs serve as an 
organisational structure directed at reforming primary health care, and its practitioners, in order to 
meet contemporary challenges faced by health care systems. Many of these challenges are related to 
determinants of health which extend into the social and structural domains and which the MLs will 
have to grapple with if they are to address key performance indicators around equity and 
effectiveness. In taking a population health planning focus, MLs are expected to develop a sound 
                                                 
4
 See https://ama.com.au/ama-response-medicare-locals-discussion-paper-governance-and-function 
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knowledge and ongoing monitoring of a community’s health and the determinants of health 
(Sturmberg, 2011). Development of stronger partnerships between primary health care clinicians and 
other local community services, which traditionally have a focus on a broader concept of health and 
non-health determinants is also expected (Smith & Mays, 2007).  
However, the feasibility and sustainability of such a broader community development approach in 
quite diverse geographical, population and resource contexts will require capital and infrastructure 
support. What incentives and funding will be provided to MLs and how this might be governed and 
allocated both at the ML level and within MLs, is unknown. It has also been argued that the 
particular structure proposed by the Government may well maintain “the prevailing disease and 
hospital centric orientation to health care, despite the desired shift towards a primary health care 
orientated health system” (Sturmberg, 2011, p. 528). Sturmberg (2011) proposes that the failure of 
the new structure to take into account epidemiology of illness and disease in combination with the 
focus on implementing policy initiatives and the control of how MLs will undertake their business, 
will serve as barriers to local responses to community contexts.  
The Health Communities reports will be the main mechanism for reporting on performance of MLs 
in relation to a community’s health and health outcomes, initially on the dimensions of equity, 
effectiveness and efficiency. The potential advantage of these reports lies in being able to identify 
and readily target determinants that improve performance in these areas, given they are likely to 
involve a complex combination of clinical (at the practice level), social (at the community level) and 
structural (at the political and systems levels) factors. The complexity of unraveling these factors and 
uncertainty about where to credit and target accountability is clearly evident. Further, there is a lack 
of clarity about government accountability, both to the MLs and communities, in the event of poor 
performance around these performance indicators and health outcomes of a community generally. 
Moreover, it is unclear what avenues will be made available for communities themselves to 
participate in decision-making and planning in light of these Reports.  
Given that Australia has been gradually attempting to transform its primary health care system over 
the last decade towards the efficient and effective management of chronic disease, MLs serves as a 
potentially significant test-case of a new governance strategy.  
  
Medicare Locals 
22 | P a g e  
 
 
 
Acronyms 
ACCHSs Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Services 
ADGP Australian Divisions of General Practice 
AGPN Australian General Practice Network 
AIHW Australian Institute of Health and Welfare  
AMA Australian Medical Association 
BPP Better Practice Program  
CCTs Coordinated Care Trials  
CDM Chronic Disease Management  
COAG Council of Australian Governments  
DoHA Department of Health and Ageing  
EPC Enhanced Primary Care program 
GPs General Practitioners 
ICCC Innovate Care of Chronic Conditions 
MBS Medical Benefits Schedule 
MLs Medicare Locals 
NHHRC National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission 
NHPA National Health Performance Authority 
PHC Primary Health Care 
PHCOs Primary Health Care Organisations 
PIP Practice Incentives Program  
PIP-DI the Practice Incentive Program-Diabetes Incentive 
RACGP Royal Australian College of General Practitioners 
SWPE Standardised Whole Patient Equivalent 
WHO World Health Organisation 
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